Our work in Lebanon

Lebanon is grappling with a prolonged, multidimensional crisis that has plunged a majority of its population into poverty and misery. Between 2018 and 2023, the country’s GDP fell from US$54,9 billion to US$17,94 billion. GDP per capita similarly plummeted from US$9,226 to US$3,350. 

Consequently, poverty has more than tripled over the past decade. About 44 per cent of the people now live in poverty, with poverty rates reaching 70 per cent in Lebanon’s more deprived areas. Food prices have soared 5,000 per cent over pre-COVID levels, and 23 per cent of the people face high levels of acute food insecurity. By 2022, life expectancy had fallen by over five years from its 2018 peak to 74.4 years. Unsurprisingly, 38 per cent of Lebanese people reported considering emigrating in a 2024 Arab Barometer survey, with 72 per cent of them citing economic reasons as their motivation. 

At the heart of these issues is a deep-seated institutional crisis whose origins go back to the National Pact of 1943, which established a denominational system; to the civil war caused by a reshuffling of the power-sharing system in 1975; and to the Taif Agreement that ended the civil war in 1990. Under these agreements, senior government posts were reserved for persons of specific religious denominations. Thus, the president has to be a Maronite Chistian; the prime minister, a Sunni Muslim; and the speaker, a Shia Muslim. 

Over the years, this system has had major consequences, including dysfunctional government, paralyzed political institutions and endemic corruption. It is evident, however, that the structure and self-image of Lebanese civil society image are less and less constrained by the straitjacket of denominational politics. Its calls to solidarity and social and democratic participation and the strength of its appeal are increasingly based on the secular concept of citizenship. 

People are questioning the assumptions on which ruling groups now at the helm of the state base their legitimacy and cling to power. Meanwhile, the system is often deadlocked, leaving the country without a president or prime minister, whereas the speaker has been in office since 1992. 

Such institutional stalemates affect various aspects of everyday life, including access to work; purchasing power; water, fuel and power supply; healthcare; and even garbage collection. Nationally important decisions are avoided, delayed or negotiated to the lowest common denominator to the extent of losing all impact. The support and integration of migrants and refugees is also affected, with political parties and religious factions blaming them for the country’s ills. 

Lebanon hosts more refugees per capita and per square kilometer than any other country in the world. This includes 1.5 million Syrian refugees and over 489,000 Palestinians. Together, they represent more than a third of the country’s population of 5.3 million. 

Another disaster struck the very heart of Lebanon on August 4, 2020, when 2.75 tons of improperly stored ammonium nitrate blew up in the port of Beirut. The blast destroyed entire districts of the capital; killed over 200 people; injured more than 6,500; and left around a million people unemployed and in need of help. Material damage was estimated at US$15 billion, almost equivalent to the country’s GDP. 

This latest tragedy has wrought destruction of such great scale and scope that Lebanon, despite the courage, strength and resilience of its people and civil society, cannot recover alone and has naturally had to look beyond its borders for support from its diaspora and international aid. 

Since the events of October 7, 2023, in Israel and the bloody war in the Gaza Strip, southern Lebanon has also borne the brunt of fighting between Hezbollah and Israel. To the detriment of the civilian population, this intensified conflict looks set to last at least as long as the Israel’s deadly military operations in Gaza continue.

This situation imposes considerable hardship on the Lebanese people, particularly because of the displacement of residents of the south and the weakening of the state.